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Abstract	  
	  
This study reports on the results of a statistical analysis in which the relationship between the 
independent variable of corruption, as measured by the World Bank, and the dependent variable 
of economic growth, as measured by percentage of GDP growth per year, was examined. The 
purpose of this study is to apply empirical methods to the debate on corruption and growth, in 
which neoclassical theory predicts that corruption retards growth but in which other models, such 
as Lewis growth and the Kuznets Curve, suggest that corruption may actually speed up growth in 
underdeveloped countries. The main finding of the study is that there is in fact a positive 
correlation between corruption and GDP growth for ten randomly-chosen countries evaluated 
from 1999-2010. Further research is recommended as a means of determining the relationship 
between corruption and growth in both mature and immature economies.  
 
Keywords: Economic growth, corruption, Kuznets Curve, Lewis growth, neoclassical theories of 
economic growth.  
 
 
In neoclassical economic theory, the existence of corruption creates problems for the 
functioning of the free market, and, in theory, creates impediments to economic growth. 
Neoclassical economic theorists have taken numerous approaches to describe the connection 
between corruption and market efficiency. Many of these approaches have focused on specific 
problems of information. For example, Winfield, Bishop, and Porter (2004) argued that, in 
corrupt economies, workers were less likely to know about available jobs and employers were 
less likely to know about the quantity of quality available, thus leading to higher employment. 
Behind all such explanations is a larger theoretical infrastructure. As Ingham (2008) argued, 
markets function according to “the interaction of supply and demand that represents the 
decisions of myriad otherwise unconnected individuals.”1 . Economies grow to the extent that 
these collective decisions are correct. As Hayek (1945) explained the matter, 
 
The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate 
“given” resources...It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of 
                     
1 Ingham, G. (2008). Capitalism, p. 9. 
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resources known to any of the members of society...it is a problem of the 
utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality.2 
 
 What happens in a state of corruption is that what Hayek (1945) refers to as resources 
beingstymied by a lower quality of information, or sometimes no information at all. Thus, in a 
corrupt country, a government with media control might promote the stock of a company that is 
actually highly inefficient, but whose CEO is related to the Prime Minister of the government. 
There are, of course, innumerable possible examples of how exactly corruption might chip away 
at the efficiency of decision-making. The purpose of this paper is not to examine these kinds of 
theoretical cases or to engage directly with the theory of market efficiency, but to conduct an 
empirical test to determine the nature of the relationship between economic growth and 
corruption. The theory of neoclassical economics leads one to expect that the relationship will be 
negative; that, in other words, high corruption will predict low growth. It is surely worthwhile to 
determine whether empirical analysis supports this expectation. 
   
Purpose of the Study 
 
 The purpose of the study is to apply quantitative methods to the exploration of the 
relationship, if any, between the variables of public sector corruption (as a proxy for politico-
economic corruption in general) and economic growth, with the larger purpose of examining 
neoclassical theoretical claims that corruption is a brake on growth. 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
 The following research questions and hypotheses will guide the study: 
 
 Research Question 1: Can corruption be held to be the principal component for the 
following World Bank (2011) dimensions: Government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control 
of corruption, and rule of law? 
 
H01:  No, there will be more than one component in any factor reduction of the 
specified dimensions. 
H1A:  Yes, there will be exactly one component in any factor reduction of the specified 
dimensions.  
 
 Research Question 2: In a time series regression model, how well do the World Bank 
(2011) dimensions of corruption—government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of 
corruption, and rule of law—predict the GDP growth of 10 randomly-selected countries treated 
as a single sample? 
 
 
                     
2 Hayek, F.A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society, p. 520. 
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 H02: The regression will not be significant. 
 H2A: The regression will be significant.   
 
Literature Review 
 
 There are two main concepts in this study: (a) economic growth; and (b) corruption, 
particularly insofar as it has economic impacts. Each of these concepts will be explored 
separately in the literature review. The final section will summarize lessons learned. 
 
Theories of Economic Growth 
 
 Why do economies grow? There are two complementary answers to this question, as 
provided by neoclassical scholars. The first answer is more theoretical and depends for its 
explanatory power on more abstract concepts of market operation. The second answer is more 
functional and marshals evidence from policy, history, and technology to make its points. 
 Ingham (2008) provided a brilliantly concise overview of Adam Smith’s definition of the 
market, as follows: “the interaction of supply and demand that represents the decisions of myriad 
otherwise unconnected individuals.”5 Again, it is the individual who is coded as being at the 
center of the market. What does this formulation mean, and how is it helpful in answering the 
question of how markets work? First, it not just any individual that is at the center of the market, 
but what, according to Smith, is called homo economicus. For Smith (1801), homo economicus is 
a profit-maximizing individual6 , who participates in the marketplace solely in order to maximize 
his or her economic position. This concept of the economic individual is radically different from 
that of, say, Aquinas (1259), who argued that the goal of participation in markets was not to 
accumulate profits, but to obtain a base level of subsistence7 , akin to what Gudeman (2001) has 
called a “pure trade” .8 Indeed, to Aquinas, participation in business for solely profit-oriented 
ends was a mortal sin .9 Therefore, homo economicus is a relatively new phenomenon. Before the 
eighteenth century and Smith’s (1801) popularization of the notion of profit-seeking as the core 
of economic activity, many people participated in the economy with purposes inimical to those 
of the market.  
 The notion of homo economicus is thus at the basis of methodological individualism as 
understood in economics. It is to the notion of homo economicus that Mises (1963) refers when 
he argues that “Monetary calculation is the main vehicle of planning and acting in the social 
setting of a society of free enterprise directed and controlled by the market and its prices.”10  It is 
by the cumulative actions of the self-interested, calculating, deciding individual agent (in a 
phrase, homo economicus) that the market is formed. This fact, and all of its implications, must 
                     
5 Ingham, G. (2008). Capitalism, p. 9 
6 Smith, A. (1801). The wealth of nations, p. 30 
7 Aquinas. (1259). The gospel of stewardship, p. 31 
8 Gudeman, S. (2001). The anthropology of economy: Community, market, and culture,  p. 98 
9 Aquinas. (1259). The gospel of stewardship, p. 31. 
10 Mises, L.V. (1963). Human action, p. 230. 
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be understood and acknowledged as the foundation of all further analysis of the mechanisms of 
the market. 
 In order to understand how markets work, it is necessary to begin from the assumption 
that a market is but the emergent condition from the collective activities of homo economicus. 
However, as Mises (1963) astutely pointed out, homo economicus does not exist in a vacuum; 
s/he requires “the social setting of a society of free enterprise.”11  In other words, markets require 
homo economicus to function, but homo economicus also requires certain pre-existing 
conditions, rules, and settings in which to carry out economic activity. It is only via this mutual 
dependency that the market society emerges (Read, 1958). 
 There are numerous implications for corruption that emerge from these theoretical 
viewpoints. First, corruption is clearly a form of interference with what Mises (1963) called 
monetary calculation and what Hayek (1945) called the utilization of knowledge. Corruption, in 
so far as it circulates lies (and, in some cases, also suppresses the truth) about economic matters, 
promotes a lower quality of individual decision-making, which in neoclassical theory should lead 
directly to market inefficiency and thence to lower rates of economic growth. However, in 
practice, this kind of causal chain has also been called into question.  
 For example, Lewis (1954) argued that economic growth was not the natural outcome of 
methodological individualism as practiced in an open and non-corrupt market, but simply the 
transfer of surplus labor from agriculture to manufacturing (and, later, to services): “The key to 
the process is the use which is made of the capitalist surplus. Insofar as this is reinvested in 
creating new capital, the capitalist sector expands, taking more people into capitalist employment 
out of the subsistence sector.”12  Technically, good use can be made of the capitalist surplus even 
in an environment of corruption. Consider China, where growth has been powered by: (a) The 
availability of a large labor pool with enough technical sophistication to run machines; (b) the 
increased flow of capital from the rest of the world to China, which in turn speeds up the growth 
of Chinese manufacturing; and (c) government policies that accelerate manufacturing, for 
example by keeping down the value of the Chinese currency relative to its export targets. 
Graham (2000) has argued that, in China, South Korea, and Japan, corruption has been an active 
part of policy, used particularly to route more business to larger corporations, but that this 
corruption has actually spurred rather than retarded growth. The same point has been made by 
Kang (2007) for the Chinese context.  
 
Considering Corruption More Closely 
 
 Even if one grants the close connection between corruption and high economic growth as 
it has historically manifested itself in East Asia (Bergsten, Freeman, Lardy, & Mitchell, 2009), 
the countries examined in this study are neither East Asian countries nor export/manufacturing 
powers. Some other theory is therefore required to examine the connection between corruption 
and economic growth.   
 The Kuznets Curve is a good possible explanation for why corruption and economic 
growth might go together even in countries without manufacturing competence and a sort of 
                     
11 Mises, L.V. (1963). Human action, p. 230. 
12 Lewis, S.A. (1954). Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour, p 151-152. 
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embedded corruption in the policy layer, as in East Asia. The Kuznets Curve is a graphical 
representation of how income inequality first rises as incomes per capita also rise; however, at a 
certain point, inequality will begin to fall as income per capita also keeps on rising (Krugman & 
Wells, 2009). There are a number of possible explanations for why the Kuznets Curve takes the 
shape that it does. First, when an economy is underdeveloped, both income inequality and per 
capita income are low. An underdeveloped economy will not have extensive capital flows, 
resulting in more income equality; as an economy first develops, most of the fruits go to the 
people who are able to make capital investments. At this point, for example, the wealthy could 
become far wealthier by hiring rural labor to work for very cheap prices in urban manufacturing 
settings. However, as per capita income keeps rising, more and more rural workers will become 
plugged into the developing economy and will be able to unionize and demand higher wages. 
Additionally, capital flows will generate better education and other opportunities that allow 
people other than the very wealthy to also benefit from the general trend of economic 
development.  
 With this background in mind, imagine the case of a newly industrializing country. Such 
a country, according to the theory implicit in the Kuznets Curve, will actually thrive on 
corruption, as corruption can make it easier and faster to plug new agricultural workers into a 
non-industrial context. Corruption can also make it easier to keep these new workers from 
unionizing and demanding higher wages. Finally, as in South Korea in the 1980s, corruption can 
also assist the economy as a whole by driving it towards sectors in which it has competitive 
advantage (Heo & Roehrig, 2010), even if doing so limits the freedom of individual participants 
in the economy.  
 On further examination, then, there is no good reason to uncritically accept the 
implication inherent in neoclassical theory that corruption retards growth by chipping away at 
the quality of information available in a market. Even if corruption does have this effect on 
markets, it also seems to help underdeveloped countries get on the right side of the Kuznets 
Curve and of Lewis (1954) growth.  It is for this reason that empirical investigations are 
important, as they can help to settle the theoretical controversy by applying data. 
 
Methodology and Data Sets 
 
 The methodology for this study is quantitative and correlative. In terms of data collection, 
an assessment of the research questions required two data sets, one each for corruption and 
economic growth. The public sector corruption data was taken from the World Bank’s (2011) 
World Governance Indicators (WGI). The WGI data set has several advantages. First, it breaks 
corruption down into four categories: (a) Government effectiveness, (b) regulatory quality, (c) 
rule of law, and (d) control of corruption. The commonly-used Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) from Transparency International (2011) is, by comparison, an incomplete dataset, as it 
aggregates corruption into a single index, which leads to the inability to analyze the different 
facts of corruption. Second, the WGI is produced by the World Bank Development Research 
Group, the World Bank Institute, and the Brookings Institution, three organizations with long 
experience in studying and quantifying corruption. Third, the WGI data set goes back several 
years, whereas the CPI data set only goes back five years. Fourth, the WGI has complete data for 
5
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200 countries, whereas there are gaps in the CPI data set. For all of these reasons, the WGI is a 
good choice of dataset through which to examine public sector corruption. 
 Economic growth was operationalized as gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
percentage. This data set was taken from the World Bank’s (2011) Web site. Once the two data 
sets—WGI and GDP growth percentage—were collected, they were input into the  SPSS ™ 18.0 
environment for statistical analysis.    
 The sampling strategy adopted by the study requires some additional discussion. The 
WGI is available for 200 countries, as are GDP growth figures. A simple random sampling 
(SRS) strategy was chosen to draw the sample. The Web site Random.org (2011) was used to 
generate a list of 10 numbers from 1 to 200. These 10 random numbers were then matched with 
the countries in the WGI’s alphabetized list. The resulting sample consisted of Australia, 
Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sweden, and Uzbekistan. 
For each of these ten countries, the WGI values for (a) government effectiveness, (b) regulatory 
quality, (c) rule of law, and (d) control of corruption were drawn from the years 1999 to 2010, 
resulting in 480 values. GDP growth per capita was also drawn from 1999 to 2010, resulting in 
another 120 values. Thus, the final data set had a total of 600 values; the raw data is reproduced 
in Appendix A.     
 The simple random sampling (SRS) approach, coupled with the use of a multi-
dimensional corruption data set and the use of 10 years in the sample were all means of 
improving the reliability and generalizability of the study. In particular, testing four separate 
forms of corruption was a means of being able to determine whether certain forms of corruption 
(such as the lack of government effectiveness) were more predictive of low economic growth 
than certain other forms of corruption (such as regulatory quality).  
 It should also be noted that the WGI scale works as follows. -2.5 is the weakest 
measurement on each of the four scales—(a) government effectiveness, (b) regulatory quality, 
(c) rule of law, and (d) control of corruption—and 2.5 is the strongest. Thus, for example, a 
country that measured 2.5 on the government effectiveness scale would have the most effective 
possible government. In SPSS ™, the four sub-scales were coded as follows: Government 
effectiveness: GE; regulatory quality: RQ; rule of law: RL; and control of corruption: CC. GDP 
growth percentage was rendered as GDP.     
 
Results 
 
 The discussion of results will be organized around the individual research questions and 
hypotheses. After the formal hypotheses are assessed, there is a discussion of the results in terms 
of ramifications for theory. 
 
Research Question One 
 
 The first research question asked: Can corruption be held to be the principal component 
for the following World Bank (2011) dimensions: Government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
control of corruption, and rule of law? The null hypothesis was that there will be more than one 
component in any factor reduction of the specified dimensions. The alternative hypothesis was 
that there will be exactly one component in any factor reduction of the specified dimensions. The 
6
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purpose of this question was to explore whether it is statistically possible to treat corruption as a 
single construct. This question is of interest because the World Bank (2011) segments corruption 
into four separate indicators, namely government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of 
corruption, and rule of law. In order to study corruption statistically, it is first necessary to 
determine the dimensionality of the concept. This analysis was carried out by the use of principal 
components analysis (PCA). Because of the high inter-correlation between the variables of 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and rule of law, promax 
rather than varimax rotation was chosen as the extraction method.  
 
Table 1 
Principal Components Analysis, Corruption (Promax Rotation) 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 Government_Effect 
Reg_Quali
ty 
Rule_of_La
w 
Control_Co
r 
Correlation Government_Effe
ct 
1.000 .964 .980 .969 
Reg_Quality .964 1.000 .972 .939 
Rule_of_Law .980 .972 1.000 .981 
Control_Cor .969 .939 .981 1.000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
Government_Effe
ct  
.000 .000 .000 
Reg_Quality .000  .000 .000 
Rule_of_Law .000 .000  .000 
Control_Cor .000 .000 .000  
 
It should be observed that there were high inter-correlations between each of the four 
measures of corruption used by the World Bank (2011), making promax rotation the appropriate 
extraction method. 
 
Communalities 
 Initial 
Extractio
n 
Government_Effe
ct 
1.000 .981 
Reg_Quality 1.000 .962 
Rule_of_Law 1.000 .991 
Control_Cor 1.000 .969 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
dim
ensi
on0 
1 3.903 97.569 97.569 3.903 97.569 97.569 
2 .061 1.530 99.099    
3 .025 .626 99.725    
4 .011 .275 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
8
LUX: A Journal of Transdisciplinary Writing and Research from Claremont Graduate University, Vol. 2 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/lux/vol2/iss1/6
DOI: 10.5642/lux.201301.06
Campbell 9 
 
LUX: A Journal of Transdisciplinary Writing and Research from Claremont Graduate University, Volume 2 
© Claremont University Consortium, December 2012  |  http://scholarship.claremont.edu/lux/ 
 
 
 Component Matrixa 
 
Compone
nt 
1 
Rule_of_Law .995 
Government_Effe
ct 
.991 
Control_Cor .984 
Reg_Quality .981 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
The PCA revealed that only one component could be extracted; this component explained 
97.559% of the variance, making for a very steep scree plot. Thus, the null hypothesis for 
research question 1 cannot be accepted; it does appear that the World Bank (2011) dimensions of 
corruption are reducible to a single corruption construct.  
Another way of getting at essentially the same conclusion is to test the multicollinearity 
of the four dimensions of corruption offered by the World Bank (2011).  
 
Table 2 
Multicollinearity Analysis (IV = Four Corruption Dimensions, DV = Growth) 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Government_Effe
ct 
.031 32.493 
Reg_Quality .045 22.418 
Rule_of_Law .016 60.734 
Control_Cor .033 30.698 
Multicollinearity Analysis (IV = Four Corruption 
Dimensions, DV = Growth)   
a. Dependent Variable: GDP_Growth 
  
It can be observed that the VIF values are all well over 10, and the tolerance values are 
all well below 0.01, leaving almost no doubt that the corruption variables are highly 
multicollinear with each other when GDP growth is treated as the DV. In other words, both PCA 
9
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and multicollinearity diagnostics give good reasons to believe that the World Bank’s (2010) four 
measures of corruption actually extract to one construct of corruption.    
 
Research Question 2 
 
 The second research question asked: In a time series regression model, how well do the 
World Bank (2011) dimensions of corruption—government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
control of corruption, and rule of law—predict the GDP growth of 10 randomly-selected 
countries treated as a single sample? The null hypothesis was that the regression will not be 
significant. The alternative hypothesis was that the regression will be significant.  To explore this 
research question, the 1999-2009 regression between GDP and corruption—in each of the 
dimensions of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and rule of 
law—was fit to the observed 2010 values.  
 
Figure 1:  P-Plot of Regression Model 
 
The p-plot demonstrates that the linear model is a fairly good fit with the data. This 
impression is confirmed in the actual regression analysis. Because of the multicollinearity of the 
IVs, there was no need to conduct the regression in such a way as to identify the R value added 
by each of the four variables. The purpose of the regression analysis was ultimately to derive the 
equation that would predict the 2010 values for each of the four dimensions of corruption, and to 
10
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test this prediction against the actual figure from 2010. With that explanation in mind, the linear 
regression analysis follows below: 
 
 
Table 3: Regression Analysis (IV =Four Dimensions of Corruption, DV = GDP Growth) 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 
1 1 .446a .199 .169 5.211826294 .199 6.531 4 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Control_Cor, Reg_Quality, Government_Effect, Rule_of_Law 
b. Dependent Variable: GDP_Growth 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model Change Statistics 
df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 1 105 .000 
 
b. Dependent Variable: 
GDP_Growth 
 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 709.567 4 177.392 6.531 .000a 
Residual 2852.129 105 27.163   
Total 3561.696 109    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Control_Cor, Reg_Quality, Government_Effect, 
Rule_of_Law 
b. Dependent Variable: GDP_Growth 
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Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 6.750 .559  12.079 .000 
Government_Effe
ct 
-1.523 2.491 -.304 -.611 .542 
Reg_Quality 4.910 2.112 .961 2.325 .022 
Rule_of_Law -4.250 3.439 -.841 -1.236 .219 
Control_Cor -.847 2.281 -.180 -.371 .711 
a. Dependent Variable: GDP_Growth 
 
The linear regression analysis was highly significant (because p < .001) and predicted 
19.9% of the variation in the DV. The linear regression equation was as follows:  
 
GDP Growth = 6.750 + (Government Effectiveness)(-1.523) + (Regulatory 
Quality)(4.910) + (Rule of Law)(-4.250) + (Control of Corruption)(-0.847). 
 
With this formula in hand, it is possible to use the 2010 observations for government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, and to see how well (in 
terms of standard deviations) they predict the actual 2010 figure for GDP growth of the sample. 
Here are the actual 2010 figures for GDP growth for each country in the sample, the predicted 
figures, and the distance (in SDs) between the actual and predicted figures: 
 
Table 4 
2010 GDP Growth Figures for All Countries in Sample 
 
Country Actual 2010 GDP 
Growth 
Predicted GDP 
Growth 
SD Difference 
 
Australia 
 
1.290121 
 
.32 
 
Less than 1 
Azerbaijan 5.000451 3.45 Less than 1 
Ethiopia 10.136945 6.79 More than 1 
Israel 4.656566 4.01 Less than 1 
Jordan 3.106954 6.99 More than 1 
Morocco 3.299156 2.34 Less than 1 
Pakistan 4.357649 3.21 Less than 1 
Sierra Leone 4.948500 .54 More than 1 
Sweden 5.536081 4.34 Less than 1 
Uzbekistan 8.500000 5.43 More than 1 
SAMPLE 6.99 3.742 More than 1 
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The linear regression was a good fit with the data in the case of Australia, Azerbaijan, 
Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, and Sweden. Also, when the sample was considered as a whole, the 
linear regression was not a good fit. This analysis leads to two conclusions: (a) Different 
countries display different dynamics when it comes to the fit between corruption and GDP 
growth and (b) the overall goodness of fit is volatile.  
 
Hypothesis Testing Table 
 
Research Question  Hypotheses Results 
Research Question 1: Can corruption 
be held to be the principal 
component for the following World 
Bank (2011) dimensions: 
Government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, control of 
corruption, and rule of law? 
H01: No, there will be more than one 
component in any factor reduction of 
the specified dimensions. 
 
H1A: Yes, there will be exactly one 
component in any factor reduction of 
the specified dimensions. 
 
Null hypothesis was rejected. 
Research Question 2: In a time 
series regression model, how well do 
the World Bank (2011) dimensions 
of corruption—government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
control of corruption, and rule of 
law—predict the GDP growth of 10 
randomly-selected countries treated 
as a single sample? 
H02: The regression will not be 
significant. 
 
H2A: The regression will be 
significant.   
 
Null hypothesis could not be 
rejected. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion of Results 
 
 Economic growth is a complex phenomenon. Historically, economies have grown in the 
absence of market efficiency. It may be the case that what neoclassical theory suggests about the 
corruption-growth relation is true for mature economies but not for immature ones, which can 
continue to post robust growth even in the absence of efficiency and information. A future study 
would do well to test the connection for more mature economies; it may be that there is a 
threshold of development beyond which the impact of corruption on growth is much more 
pronounced than it was in this sample.  
 The results of the study were as follows: (a) Corruption is a single construct that exerts 
significant influence on the dimensions of government effectiveness, rule of law, control of 
corruption, and regulatory quality when these variables are treated as IVs for the DV of GDP 
growth; thus, on a conceptual level, there is a close link between  corruption and GDP growth; 
and (b) in time series, the four variables of government effectiveness, rule of law, control of 
corruption, and regulatory quality did not serve as close (less than 1 SD) of GDP growth when 
1999-2009 was treated as the observation period, and 2010 was the case; thus, there is some 
volatility in the GDP growth-corruption link that needs to be explored further.   
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Appendix A: Raw Data 
 
 Table 5 contains all the raw data used in the study as it was entered into SPSS. All of the 
data were obtained from the World Bank (2011). It should be noted that Case 1: Australia, Case 
2: Azerbaijan, Case 3: Ethiopia, Case 4: Israel, Case 5: Jordan, Case 6: Morocco, Case 7: 
Pakistan, Case 8: Sierra Leone, Case 9: Sweden, and Case 10: Uzbekistan.  
 
Table 5:  Raw Data for the Study 
 
 Case Government_Effect Reg_Quality Rule_of_Law Control_Cor GDP_Growth 
1 1.659664 1.290418 1.708992 1.884342 5.160042 
1 1.602496 1.468103 1.769038 1.765288 3.950023 
1 1.744479 1.655114 1.725923 1.960539 1.979972 
1 1.706604 1.456512 1.762698 1.734808 3.829966 
1 1.840580 1.590999 1.825701 1.924659 3.160016 
1 2.030122 1.743432 1.823453 2.097819 4.139959 
1 1.772699 1.606607 1.713069 1.934268 2.840068 
1 1.742145 1.625979 1.757039 1.960590 3.069944 
1 1.847083 1.681155 1.747598 2.047173 3.770041 
1 1.802697 1.769631 1.766647 2.120563 3.729978 
1 1.750688 1.780546 1.737847 2.056221 1.290121 
1 1.816225 1.656553 1.770200 2.061007 2.455885 
2 -.940232 -1.109611 -1.056318 -1.257760 7.400000 
2 -.973489 -.956735 -1.067130 -1.128473 11.100000 
2 -.984711 -.921543 -1.093343 -1.098676 9.900000 
2 -.947459 -.723752 -.862705 -1.057677 10.600000 
2 -.795085 -.595555 -.829408 -.943471 11.200000 
2 -.769487 -.593428 -.807660 -1.076350 10.200000 
2 -.647141 -.549935 -.748930 -.991265 26.400000 
2 -.617721 -.499194 -.840134 -.982672 34.500000 
2 -.768178 -.444459 -.790404 -1.021013 25.049000 
2 -.759593 -.343754 -.770317 -1.018693 10.800000 
2 -.683165 -.367201 -.860067 -1.098975 9.300000 
2 -.839290 -.444504 -.882899 -1.172476 5.000451 
3 -1.282354 -1.337455 -.835047 -1.156064 5.162406 
3 -.937772 -1.176876 -.736867 -.694222 6.072859 
3 -.913406 -1.159953 -.834544 -.493322 8.301432 
3 -.929978 -1.232561 -.873446 -.732055 1.514717 
3 -.895871 -1.174734 -.714305 -.697760 -2.161082 
3 -.705378 -.962908 -.725596 -.700956 13.572361 
3 -.894767 -1.109605 -.864727 -.775617 11.818844 
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3 -.591183 -.945077 -.592690 -.625641 10.834629 
3 -.422893 -.890041 -.591736 -.612516 11.456015 
3 -.411041 -.827518 -.654078 -.653383 10.788554 
3 -.418031 -.947195 -.780866 -.733391 8.791996 
3 -.349221 -.884247 -.755556 -.704570 10.136945 
4 .991541 1.092473 1.258530 1.471174 3.300639 
4 1.120938 1.064131 1.072206 1.291518 9.196468 
4 1.183603 1.186582 1.055026 1.060521 -.042460 
4 1.077059 .964155 1.033463 1.284244 -.664881 
4 1.214810 .942278 .824221 1.064576 1.511574 
4 1.258483 .853964 .826532 .920623 4.998352 
4 1.055816 .884121 .805676 .818700 5.098819 
4 1.324314 1.011001 .894705 1.003169 5.698423 
4 1.266122 1.095820 .872173 .806560 5.314894 
4 1.345444 1.167046 .886149 .842456 4.261645 
4 1.137558 1.109720 .809369 .723207 .765950 
4 1.243075 1.215053 .876554 .635113 4.656566 
5 .050700 .028946 .295918 -.127159 3.391002 
5 .087430 .400805 .377244 -.012571 4.244563 
5 -.037881 .246179 .375207 .028388 5.269296 
5 .093582 .029778 .165710 -.104231 5.785796 
5 .237250 .221963 .391021 .304168 4.178075 
5 .152728 .325558 .394881 .370979 8.558951 
5 .029136 .162978 .412803 .325915 8.121308 
5 .136366 .353991 .428311 .304255 7.943712 
5 .193374 .321867 .478899 .297889 8.486978 
5 .212557 .340466 .488858 .425421 7.608863 
5 .223290 .300326 .295002 .192704 2.325338 
5 .078913 .243971 .219381 .040348 3.106954 
6 -.033482 -.166049 .305092 .325025 .529417 
6 .027467 -.057108 .282571 .406404 1.592568 
6 -.030984 -.051417 .163697 -.031391 7.551952 
6 -.135538 -.156851 .005331 -.171820 3.316036 
6 -.115209 -.270401 .011570 -.211233 6.316967 
6 -.000945 -.263513 .080451 -.088444 4.801866 
6 -.259468 -.405823 -.127373 -.301038 2.978512 
6 -.122879 -.169361 -.218345 -.401103 7.759852 
6 -.167824 -.191485 -.191711 -.329853 2.705774 
6 -.172265 -.179445 -.260801 -.369571 5.587056 
6 -.204823 -.056922 -.216827 -.311046 4.948633 
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6 -.169997 -.113998 -.185240 -.158336 3.299156 
7 -.587722 -.455160 -.653582 -1.156064 3.660133 
7 -.448940 -.494710 -.694577 -.963969 4.260088 
7 -.577282 -.749842 -.858550 -.824593 1.982484 
7 -.393598 -.798149 -.692633 -.928953 3.224430 
7 -.416672 -.726962 -.766449 -.720799 4.846321 
7 -.442181 -.893113 -.811158 -1.089137 7.368571 
7 -.426255 -.613402 -.873671 -1.048273 7.667304 
7 -.404329 -.463446 -.826399 -.769768 6.177542 
7 -.453421 -.515795 -.900537 -.748676 5.683116 
7 -.683806 -.582686 -.971667 -.805081 1.595981 
7 -.779226 -.548306 -.883006 -1.084259 3.632478 
7 -.767301 -.596679 -.785571 -1.103601 4.357649 
8 -1.465737 -1.614127 -1.488120 -.776769 -8.121774 
8 -1.456773 -1.325973 -1.195675 -.874309 3.807283 
8 -1.459702 -1.387627 -1.402734 -.916408 18.169937 
8 -1.513765 -1.267620 -1.328197 -.751094 27.461715 
8 -1.234312 -1.145831 -1.223377 -.908741 9.288053 
8 -1.115024 -1.003607 -1.090035 -.875857 7.513944 
8 -1.351272 -1.082929 -1.193759 -1.095469 7.178284 
8 -1.177747 -1.168498 -1.056724 -1.042335 7.280906 
8 -1.194187 -1.062526 -1.045072 -.891336 6.442019 
8 -1.169941 -.969280 -.967970 -.930563 5.534067 
8 -1.195736 -.783053 -.914145 -.927958 3.200000 
8 -1.190553 -.722749 -.940364 -.757087 4.948500 
9 1.987468 1.363200 1.799890 2.304953 4.659838 
9 1.994642 1.259979 1.778988 2.331185 4.452193 
9 2.001230 1.476247 1.801172 2.417421 1.262310 
9 2.012313 1.651065 1.856106 2.312793 2.483417 
9 2.076163 1.649411 1.888332 2.233149 2.335702 
9 2.101886 1.688025 1.901101 2.173478 4.234862 
9 1.897808 1.517435 1.778742 2.011842 3.160785 
9 1.869500 1.469833 1.847456 2.211880 4.297179 
9 1.986614 1.605360 1.894216 2.249531 3.314245 
9 1.906469 1.680807 1.923738 2.255100 -.613416 
9 2.039314 1.716703 1.950401 2.275511 -5.333024 
9 2.016361 1.719856 1.947921 2.250953 5.536081 
10 -1.147974 -1.866500 -1.085783 -1.073197 4.300000 
10 -1.251375 -2.146652 -1.146304 -1.046174 3.800000 
10 -.949327 -2.098461 -1.128239 -.908705 4.200000 
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10 -1.185245 -1.560797 -1.466131 -.992828 4.000000 
10 -1.113833 -1.527170 -1.374255 -1.006303 4.200000 
10 -.992262 -1.644441 -1.347473 -1.056435 7.700000 
10 -1.202841 -1.580688 -1.444766 -1.183383 7.000000 
10 -1.059061 -1.639265 -1.418052 -.902223 7.300000 
10 -.781090 -1.429638 -1.045599 -.814400 9.500000 
10 -.764474 -1.389499 -1.123595 -1.026396 9.000000 
10 -.707807 -1.495266 -1.273099 -1.264270 8.100000 
10 -.796789 -1.589353 -1.372552 -1.316347 8.500000 
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